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Lapides v. Board of Regents and the
Untrustworthiness of Unanimous
Supreme Court Decisions

PAUL HORTON*

A former judge’s yearning for consensus on the United States
Supreme Court resonates pleasantly with most of us most of the time.
The United States Supreme Court has seriously misled the public as to the
function of a judge. Despite the textbook model of a democracy, democratic
institutions strive not for majorities but for consensus and, if possible, for
unanimity. . . .
. . . The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, regularly decides
cases by votes of five to four and, worse, three to two to four. Instability in the
law, and even chaos in the streets, is often the result.1

His hyperbole aside, all of us can bring quickly to mind an abundance of
fractured Supreme Court decisions that support the judge’s accusations.
Supreme Court unanimity, however, sometimes comes at a big price.
Getting to consensus often requires compromise, and compromise
typically entails sacrifices of the kind of rationality and precision we
associate with argument from rule or principle. Supposedly the Supreme
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. This article draws
inspiration from Ryan Saunders’ project—a mock Lapides opinion—for Adjudication
Seminar in Spring 2003. I am deeply indebted to Alicia Mead, my research assistant of
the illustrious 50th Anniversary Class, not just for her many contributions, but also for
her devotion to this project.
1. Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Everything You Always Wanted to Know About
Judges but Were Afraid to Ask, 49 S.C. L. REV. 343, 345–46 (1998). For chaos in the
streets, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fractured decisions), and progeny. But
for maybe more chaos in the streets, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(unanimous decision).
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Court deals with weighty issues framed in heated controversy, often with
splits between whole circuits over how these issues ought to be resolved;
one might guess that if consensus has not already been reached below,
then consensus will not be reached above if the High Court is doing its
job. And thus, we just might be entitled to suspect that a nice, clean
unanimous Supreme Court decision sometimes, at least sometimes,
indicates that someone up there was asleep at the switch.
Take the Court’s recent Eleventh Amendment decisions for example.
Unanimity, while not completely unknown, did not characterize the
Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence between 1985 and 2000,
and, more often than not, the Court’s Eleventh Amendment decisions
revealed deep splits.2 Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment has figured one
way or another in a large number of the Supreme Court’s decisions
during the last century or so, but only a handful of them were
unanimous.3 I have heard that some Constitutional Law teachers avoid
the Eleventh Amendment in their courses, waiting patiently for its
doctrine to settle down. After two decades of hard-fought, inch-by-inch
progress, mostly in the direction of clarifying the relationship between
the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrines associated with State
Sovereign Immunity, the Rehnquist Court has again opted for disarray.
Like other unanimous Eleventh Amendment decisions, the Court’s 2002

2. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (7–2 decision); Vt. Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (6–1–2 decision);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (5 with respect to Parts I, II, and IV of
the Court’s opinion, 7 with respect to Part III, 4 dissenting with respect to Parts I, II, and
IV, and a different 2 dissenting with respect to Part III); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999) (5–4 decision); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999) (5–4 decision); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (5–4 decision), aff’d, 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998) (unanimous decision); Idaho
v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (5–4 decision); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997) (unanimous decision); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (5–4 decision); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30
(1994) (5–4); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (unanimous decision, except Thomas,
J., who took no part); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (6–3
decision); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18
(1990) (unanimous decision); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96
(1989) (4–1–4 decision); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (5–3 decision);
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (5–4 decision); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (4–1–4 decision); Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265 (1986) (2–4–3 decision); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (5–4 decision);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (5–4 decision).
3. See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004); Lapides v. Bd.
of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002); Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 491; Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 519 U.S. at 425; Hafer, 502 U.S. at 21; McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 18;
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436 (1883); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
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Lapides decision4 resonates more like a fist on the keys than a major
ninth.
1. The Eleventh surely must be counted among the most straightforward
and elegant of our Constitution’s Amendments:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.5

Anyone with passing familiarity with the Constitution’s text knows
where to look for the meaning of “judicial power.” Article III makes it
pretty clear that the federal courts hold the judicial power of the United
States. The most pertinent passages in Article III section 2 provide:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to Controversies . . . between a State
and Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.6

One needs neither more information nor much common sense to
conclude that these passages in Article III gave federal courts
jurisdiction over lawsuits between a State and folks who were not that
State’s citizens, that something led people in high places to realize that
doing so was wrong, and that the Eleventh Amendment removed from
“the Judicial power of the United States” jurisdiction over lawsuits
commenced against a State by a noncitizen of that State. Such a little,
but likely important, change.
2. The textualism produced by the innocent combination of a little
knowledge with common sense sometimes is a dangerous thing.
Sometimes the tendency simply to read and react to canonical text leads
one to overlook plausible alternative interpretations. But what is there to
interpret in the Eleventh Amendment? And when we add the most
easily accessible historical context—Chisholm v. Georgia7—to what we
have so far, what we have so far seems comfortably confirmed.
Chisholm involved a diversity lawsuit commenced in the United States
Supreme Court in 1792, a scant handful of years after the Constitution
4.
5.
6.
7.

Lapides, 535 U.S. at 613.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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became the United States Constitution, by some South Carolina creditors
seeking a money judgment against their debtor, the State of Georgia.
Georgia refused to appear or otherwise submit to the Court’s jurisdiction
to entertain the suit. The plaintiffs, through the United States Attorney
General, sought a writ to compel the State’s appearance and answer
under threat of default judgment.8 Of the Court’s five Justices, four—two
of whom had been members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
and another of whom had participated with Hamilton and Madison in
authoring the Federalist Papers—supported the issuance of the writ in
opinions that, however wide-ranging, rested on the text of Article III.9
Justice Iredell, the lone Chisholm dissenter, avoided the Constitution’s
text. In his view, Article III articulated the theoretical boundaries of the
federal judicial power. But legislation was required to grant the
authority and means to enable that power, and Congress had refrained
from touching State sovereign immunity—an immunity that, to Justice
Iredell, preexisted the Constitution and remained after its ratification—in
the pertinent enablement.10
The United States’ response to Chisholm was swift and meaningful.
The first bill proposing the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in
Congress two days after the decision was filed. Congress enacted its
final proposal, looking much like the first, in March 1794. A year later,
enough States ratified it. President Adams, however, did not announce
its ratification until January 1798.11 In Hollingsworth v. Virginia,
another diversity lawsuit filed in the Supreme Court, the Court
effectively bowed to the new text and to the popular will behind it in a
per curiam decision filed February 14, 1798:
THE COURT, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered a unanimous
opinion, that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not be
exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued
by the citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.12

8. Id.
9. The five opinions in Chisholm were authored by Justices Iredell, Blair, Wilson,
Cushing, and by Chief Justice Jay.
10. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also CLYDE E. JACOBS,
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 39–42 (1972) (arguing that
although the First Congress understood that States would be suable in federal court, it
failed to pass the necessary provisions in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to effectuate this
understanding).
11. For a good history of the trip the Eleventh Amendment took from its
introduction as a bill to ratification by the States, see the briefs in In re Ayres, 123 U.S.
443, 462–64 (1887), and Justice Kennedy’s more complete historical account in Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–27 (1999).
12. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 382 (1798).
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The Court then extended its declaration of no federal judicial power over
actions brought against a State by a noncitizen of that State nunc pro
tunc at least as far back as Chisholm.13 Thus, by the end of the
eighteenth century, the Eleventh Amendment had been entered into the
Constitution and had been put to bed with the Supreme Court’s
definitive holding that it meant just what it said. Hollingsworth has
never explicitly been overruled.
3. Maybe a little interpretation is needed after all. We know that U.S.
adjudication is divided into federal and state systems. We also know
that the Eleventh Amendment blockades the use of federal courts for the
commencement and prosecution of suits against a State by noncitizens of
that State. The question becomes which suits—all of them or just some
of them?
Federal courts do not possess general original jurisdiction. Article III
of the Constitution specifies the grounds for original jurisdiction, and
divides the world of federal civil trial adjudication into two general
parts: diversity/alienage and federal question. We know that the
Eleventh Amendment speaks to this Article III original jurisdiction. We
also know that the Eleventh Amendment, unlike Article III, says nothing
about States as the commencers and prosecutors. We are dealing, then,
with suits brought by individuals as plaintiffs against States as defendants.
From here on out, I will use “Citizen” to refer to an individual civil
litigant against a State who is a citizen of that State, and I will use
“Noncitizen” to refer to an individual civil litigant against a State who is
not a citizen of that State. Litigants can commence and prosecute their
claims against States in eight basic configurations, six of which
implicate the Article III federal judicial power:
Citizens with claims against their own State might commence and
prosecute them (1) in federal court (federal claims); (2) in federal
court (state claims); (3) in state court (federal claims); (4) in state
court (state claims).
Noncitizens with claims against States might commence and
prosecute them (5) in federal court (federal claims); (6) in federal
court (state claims; diversity or alienage jurisdiction); (7) in state
court (federal claims); (8) in state court (state claims).
13. The Court had held the writ issued in Chisholm in abeyance pending the
proceedings that led to the Eleventh Amendment. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 480 n.*.
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We know that Article III’s provisions on original-jurisdiction do not
recognize configuration (2), and do not reach configuration (4), even by
implication. We know that the text of the Eleventh Amendment specifically
excludes configuration (6). We also know that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment does not deal with configurations (1), (3), (7), and (8). That
leaves us with configuration (5)—Noncitizen brings federal question
claim against State in federal court—to worry about so far as the text of
the Eleventh Amendment is concerned.
The argument for including configuration (5) within the Eleventh
Amendment’s exclusion from federal judicial power is that the
Amendment’s text refers to “any suit in law or equity,” a phrase that
seems to include federal question suits as well as diversity suits. If that
is what the Eleventh Amendment says, then Noncitizen must commence
his or her federal question suit in state court. The argument for
excluding configuration (5) from the Eleventh Amendment’s exclusion
regards the text of Article III as contributing to the meaning of the
Amendment. Aside from the partial phrase “law and equity,” which
echoes the same partial phrase in Article III’s “federal question”
provision, the text of the Eleventh Amendment seems to target the two
Article III provisions alluding to diversity/alienage civil actions
involving States and Noncitizens.
We are faced, then, with a question of interpretation for which
assistance outside the Eleventh Amendment’s text will prove necessary.
Hollingsworth may have answered that question, one month after the
Eleventh Amendment became official constitutional text. However,
Hollingsworth, like Chisholm, was a diversity case, not a federal
question case. The narrowest legitimate interpretation will be that the
Eleventh Amendment eliminates diversity lawsuits commenced by
Noncitizens against States from the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The broadest legitimate interpretation will be that the Eleventh
Amendment eliminates diversity lawsuits and federal question lawsuits
commenced by Noncitizens against States from the original jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
The broadest interpretation seems clearly assumed by Chief Justice
Marshall in Osborn v. President, Directors & Co. of Bank of the United
States,14 the first Supreme Court decision holding that a plaintiff with a
federal claim could avoid the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh
Amendment by suing State officers and not the State itself, over a
14. Osborn v. President, Directors & Co. of the Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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dissent by Justice Johnson that no federal question was actually
involved. The Reconstruction Court, while confronting a large number
of actions claiming that Southern States were unconstitutionally
outmaneuvering their creditors by impairing the obligations of their own
contracts, solidified the broad interpretation.15 And, when asked to
revisit the old issue (mostly by its dissenters), the Rehnquist Court
seems tentatively to have mustered a bare majority willing to adopt the
broad, includes-federal question construction of the Amendment’s
terms.16
I confess here to wishing that Chief Justice Marshall, writing a mere
thirty years after Chisholm, was wrong. As I read the Eleventh
Amendment’s text, limitation of the Amendment to diversity cases
harmonizes with my intuition, while expanding the limitation to include
federal question cases seems grating and dissonant.17 Others’ reactions
to the Eleventh Amendment’s text in the shadow of Article III may
differ from mine. I think the broadest legitimate interpretation creates
problems for the resolution of a few federal question claims that are
eliminated or made less difficult under the narrowest legitimate
interpretation.18 I am guessing, on the other hand, that the broadest
15. “That a State cannot be sued by a citizen of another State, or of a foreign state,
on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, is clearly established by the decisions of this court in several recent
cases.” Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
16. This construction of the Eleventh Amendment was presaged by Justice
Powell’s plurality opinion in Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468, 476–88 (1987), an opinion that should not have used, and did not need, the
Eleventh Amendment to make this point. See id. at 488–93; see, e.g., Fed. Mar.
Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 743 (2002) (5–4 holding that Federal
Maritime Commission is barred from adjudicating private complaints against states);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687–88
n.5 (1999) (the 5–4 majority dismissed Justice Breyer’s attempt to revisit the issue of the
Eleventh Amendment’s coverage of federal question jurisdiction); cf. Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (5–4 decision holding that Indian tribes are generally
barred from suing States in federal court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(5–4 decision holding that Congress could not abrogate States’ immunity under the
Indian Commerce Clause).
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently shares my intuitive reaction to the text:
“[T]he text of the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . .” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
18. By “a few federal claims” I mean those federal question claims, these days few
in number, that are brought by Noncitizens against States rather than by Citizens against
States. Justice Kennedy appears to concur with my cost-benefit analysis of the broad
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to include federal question claims:
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legitimate interpretation requires federal courts to worry less than would
be necessary under the narrowest legitimate interpretation about their
jurisdiction over lawsuits involving a mix of federal question and
diversity claims. Others may not care much about these problems, or
may think they have solutions for them that do not offend the text of the
Eleventh Amendment.
At present, however, I am not concerned about the resolution of the
question of how the Eleventh Amendment is to be interpreted. Of
course, whether you fall on the narrow side or on the broad side of the
answer to this question of interpretation, I hope you agree with my
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment’s text. I am only concerned
that you recognize my position that the Eleventh Amendment must be
understood to remove from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts
either some or all of the civil lawsuits that Article III authorizes
Noncitizens to bring against States.
4. The Eleventh Amendment has provided the ground for many pitched
Supreme Court battles, and one easily gets sidetracked while engaged in
criticism. Having come this far, let me clarify what I am not criticizing
here.
My argument has nothing to do with how to tell whether a Noncitizen
is commencing or prosecuting an action against a State. Early in the
Nation’s history, Chief Justice Marshall tested the Eleventh Amendment
simply by looking at the named parties.19 The Reconstruction Court
revisited his test and searched seriously (to the State’s benefit) for real
Neither in theory nor in practice has it been shown problematic to have federal
claims resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity would
be applicable in federal court but for an exception based on Young. For
purposes of the Supremacy Clause, it is simply irrelevant whether the claim is
brought in state or federal court. Federal courts, after all, did not have general
federal-question jurisdiction until 1875. Assuming the availability of a state
forum with the authority and procedures adequate for the effective vindication
of federal law, due process concerns would not be implicated by having state
tribunals resolve federal-question cases.
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 274–75 (Kennedy, J., for a Court plurality).
19. Marshall’s most widely quoted statement to this effect comes from Osborn:
[T]he 11th amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the constitution
over suits against states, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in which a state
is a party on the record.
The state not being a party on the record, and the court having jurisdiction
over those who are parties on the record, the true question is, not one of
jurisdiction, but whether, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court ought to
make a decree against the defendants; whether they are to be considered as
having a real interest, or as being only nominal parties.
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 857–58; see also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139–
40 (1809) (treating the named party as the real defendant despite the State’s significant
interest in the outcome).
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parties in interest20 until its successor Court settled the test in Ex parte
Young.21 I like Chief Justice Marshall’s test, better than the later ones,
but that is not why I am complaining here.
My argument has nothing to do with the old question whether the
Eleventh Amendment reaches the appellate jurisdiction as well as the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts. In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief
Justice Marshall answered this question by confining the Amendment’s
constriction to the federal courts’ original jurisdiction.22 No serious
effort to revisit his answer has ever been made, and I make none here.
My argument has nothing to do with the controversy over whether
Congress can make State courts of general jurisdiction entertain federal
claims commenced or prosecuted by Citizens or Noncitizens against
their State targets.23 It must be true that disabling Congress from
exercising this option likely would prevent a few additional good claims
from being asserted against States. It also must be true that the
overwhelming majority of federal claims by persons against States are
commenced by Citizens, not Noncitizens, and thus are claims to which
the Eleventh Amendment does not speak.
My argument will not resolve the troublesome questions of just how
and when a State can effectively consent to, withdraw consent to, or
waive immunity from suit in federal court. The Supreme Court has made a
20. Louisiana was the primary recipient of the Supreme Court’s largess. See, e.g.,
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 89, 91 (1883) (New Hampshire was just a
front for its citizens who were Louisiana’s creditors; original proceeding in Supreme
Court dismissed); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728 (1883) (holding that Louisiana
officials were not subject to plaintiff’s mandamus action in federal court, because the suit
against them for payment of debt from the public treasury was actually against the State);
see also In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 462 (1887) (concluding that because the State of
Virginia, not its Attorney General and Auditor, was the real party in interest in this suit
for repayment of a debt, petitioners were discharged of the contempt citations entered
against them issued by the federal circuit court).
21. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that state officials may be
sued in federal court for injunctive relief to prevent violating federal law); see also
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74; Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 277; Blatchford v.
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779–86 (1991) (reaffirming the Young doctrine as
an important safety valve, on the assumptions that (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars
Noncitizens’ federal question claims, and that (2) Indian tribes on reservation lands
within the State they are suing (or the State that is suing them) are nonetheless
Noncitizens of that State).
22. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415 (1821).
23. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding 5–4 that Congress cannot
subject States to private civil actions in their own courts under the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
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shambles of answering these questions, and has significantly contributed
to the shambles in the decision I am about to discuss. My argument goes
no further than to make these troublesome questions irrelevant in
lawsuits that fall within the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.
My argument will seem to require some defense against three
problematic areas, at least two of which have some doctrine attached: (1)
suits commenced in federal court by private parties against members to
interstate compacts; (2) counterclaims and the like asserted by private
parties against States that have initiated litigation against them in federal
court; (3) congressional attempts to require States to consent to suit in
federal court in return for federal benefits. I will try to mention these
areas again later in this article.
I will be tempted to pay considerable and detailed attention to
statements made in recent Supreme Court majority and plurality
opinions that seem to contradict my argument. I will resist that
temptation by conceding that bad Supreme Court language contradicts
me. The results in these opinions do not. Part of my project here will be
to test how seriously the High Court intends this bad language.
5. What does Lapides v. Board of Regents24 have to do with the Eleventh
Amendment? The answer, so far, is nothing. Paul Lapides—a Kennesaw
State University instructor, doubtless a Georgia citizen, employed by
Georgia’s state university system—brought a civil action in a proper
Georgia Superior Court against a Georgia state agency and various
Georgia state employees in their official and personal capacities,
claiming violations of both Georgia state law and federal law. The
federal claims in the complaint privileged the defendants to remove
Lapides’ action to federal court, and they did so. Once there, the state
agency moved to dismiss Lapides’ complaint against it. The district
court refused to dismiss the State from the suit, holding that its
participation in the act of removal amounted to a waiver of its “Eleventh
Amendment immunity” from suit in federal court. The Court of Appeals
reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.25 After
noting that the District Court had dismissed the federal claims against
the individual defendants, and that Lapides’ federal claim against the
State was not a cognizable one,26 the Court held:

24. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
25. Id. at 624.
26. See id. at 616 (addressing claims against individual defendants); id. at 617
(discussing a claim against State: “Lapides’ only federal claim against the State arises
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that
a State is not a ‘person’ against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages might be
asserted.” (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989))).
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We conclude that the State’s action joining the removing of this case to
federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity—though, as we have
said, the District Court may well find that this case, now raising only state-law
issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts for determination.27

Regardless of one’s reaction to this result, the wrong vehicle must
have been carelessly chosen to reach it. A unanimous Lapides Court
held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
removes to federal court a case brought by a Citizen (that is, one of the
State’s own citizens) against it in state court (in this case, one of the
State’s own courts). If the Court actually means what it unanimously
said, its opinion is wrong in nearly every traditional way known to
constitutional jurisprudence: disregard of constitutional text; misuse (at
least misreading) of precedents; avoidance of the narrow in favor of the
sweeping; and indifference to likely consequences.
6. The doctrines associated with Sovereign Immunity—that a Sovereign
is not amenable to suit without its consent—cover a much broader, yet
also narrower, range than the text of the Eleventh Amendment. I am not
about to revive the argument Justice Wilson so eloquently expressed in
Chisholm that States of the United States are not the “sovereigns”
entitled to this sovereign immunity.28 I recognize, and forgive, the
Court’s often mistaken use of “Eleventh Amendment” as a stand-in for
the breadth of State Sovereign Immunity; that is to say, for the
proposition that a sovereign is not amenable to suit. A State “not
amenable to suit” with respect to claims falling within the Eleventh
Amendment’s text is a State not amenable to suit.
The Lapides Court, like some Courts before it, carelessly cites Hans v.
Louisiana29 for the proposition that Eleventh Amendment equals
Sovereign Immunity.30 Hans held no such thing. In Hans, Louisiana
creditors, claiming unconstitutional impairment of contract, sued their
debtor, the State of Louisiana, in a federal trial court over actions the
State had taken to avoid these debts. Louisiana moved to dismiss,
asserting that “[p]laintiff cannot sue the state without its permission; the
27. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 624.
28. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454–58 (1793) (Wilson, J.,
concurring).
29. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
30. Indeed, Lapides begins dramatically with this erroneous assertion: “The
Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of
other States . . . and by its own citizens as well, Hans v. Louisiana . . . .” Lapides, 535
U.S. at 616.

1067

HORTON.DOC

8/22/2019 10:29 AM

constitution and laws do not give this honorable court jurisdiction of a
suit against the state, and its jurisdiction is respectfully declined.”31 The
trial court dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.32
The Hans creditors argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
their federal suit. Of course they were correct on this point, and the
Court confessed as much.33 But then the Hans Court turned away from
the Eleventh Amendment toward what lay behind it—Chisholm v.
Georgia, Hamilton’s Federalist 81, and Madison’s explanation of
Article III during Virginia’s ratification convention—and held that the
Chisholm dissenter was right that the Constitution, and specifically the
terms of Article III, had been articulated against a law background that
included State sovereign immunity:
The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and
forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when
establishing the judicial power of the United States. . . .
The suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law.
This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it
is hardly necessary to be formally asserted. It was fully shown by an exhaustive
examination of the old law by Mr. Justice Iredell in his opinion in Chisholm v.
Georgia; and it has been conceded in every case since, where the question has,
in any way, been presented, even in the cases which have gone farthest in
sustaining suits against the officers or agents of States.34

In other words, Sovereign Immunity—that a State is not amenable to suit
(including suit commenced in federal court) without its consent—and
not the Eleventh Amendment was the Court’s basis for dismissing the
Louisiana creditors’ suit in Hans. Hans never said “Eleventh Amendment
equals Sovereign Immunity.” Hans said that State sovereign immunity
was accommodated by implication in the original Constitution,
independently of the Eleventh Amendment, and that the Chisholm
majority was wrong to imagine otherwise.
7. Indeed, Chisholm’s rejection of State Sovereign Immunity furnishes
the only reason—a false positive produced by coincidence—for
conjoining Eleventh Amendment with that more general doctrine. I
would not bet against the notion that if the majority in Chisholm v.
Georgia had joined instead of overridden Justice Iredell, then (1) the
31. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
32. Id. at 4, 21.
33. [T]he plaintiff in error contends that he, being a citizen of Louisiana, is not
embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that
amendment only prohibits suits against a State which are brought by . . . subjects
of a foreign State. It is true, the amendment does so read: and if there were no
other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable . . . .
Id. at 10.
34. Id. at 15–16.
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Eleventh Amendment would never have come into being, and (2) to this
day our federal Constitution, with its Article III intact, would be
interpreted to assume State Sovereign Immunity with respect to suits
between a State and its own citizens, citizens of other States, or citizens
of foreign nations. Claimant would bring suit against State in federal
court. The suit, if maintainable against another individual regardless of
the latter’s consent, would also be maintainable against State if State
consented to suit.
I submit here to the general rule of Hans v. Louisiana as Hans
expressed that rule. Suppose you were on the Chisholm Court. Or
suppose you were the Hans Court asked to step into the shoes of the
Chisholm Court. You had interpreted a phrase in Article III to mean
exactly what it said, over a vigorous dissent arguing for a pervasive
constitutional background of State Sovereign Immunity. Congress,
followed by the States, had responded by passing a constitutional
amendment that (among other things) had obliterated Chisholm’s precise
holding as clearly as words could manage without mentioning names.
How would you treat the resulting void? I think that you have four
options.
(1) You could admit your error in interpreting Article III the way
you did in Chisholm. Then you could ignore the new amendment’s
text and say the amendment obliterated Chisholm in toto, restoring the
field of State Sovereign Immunity to its preexisting condition, and
nothing more.
(2) You could refuse to admit your error in interpreting Article III
the way you did in Chisholm. Then you could settle exclusively on the
new amendment’s text and say it did nothing more than overrule the
explicit holding in Chisholm—addressing only Noncitizens’ lawsuits
against States brought in federal court—without touching the rest of
your understanding of the U.S. Constitution’s effect on preexisting
State Sovereign Immunity.
(3) You could refuse to admit your error in interpreting Article III
the way you did in Chisholm. Then you could ignore the amendment’s
text and say the new amendment restored the field of State Sovereign
Immunity to the condition it was in before Article III became effective.
(4) You could admit your error in interpreting Article III the way
you did in Chisholm. Then you could respect both the amendment’s text
and the amendment’s immediate effect. You could say the new
amendment obliterated Chisholm in toto, restoring the field of State
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Sovereign Immunity to its preexisting condition, except to the extent
the terms of the amendment altered the preexisting condition.
And, if you were just a little bit humble, and just a little bit respectful of
the ability of other intelligent people to write things down on pieces of
paper, you would choose the fourth of these options. As I have noted
previously, the Hans Court circumvented option (1). The Hans Court
clearly rejected option (2).35 Thanks to a perfunctory concurrence in
which Justice Harlan must have chosen either option (2) or option (3),36
we can say with comfort that the Hans Court selected option (4). We
might, in short, join the Supreme Court in its common post-Hans
observation, so far as that observation concerns the general rule of State
Sovereign Immunity:
Although the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict only
the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood
the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition . . . which it confirms.” That presupposition, first observed over
a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana . . . has two parts: first, that each State is a
sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that “‘[i]t is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent.’”37

8. Submission to the general rule expressed in Hans fairly implies my
willingness to admit a qualification or two not expressed in Hans. For
example, I am willing to admit that Congress, acting in pursuance of its
constitutional authority, might be able to modify the breadth of State
Sovereign Immunity. I would be willing to admit, for example, that
35. It was argued by the opponents of the Constitution that this clause would
authorize jurisdiction to be given to the federal courts to entertain suits against
a State brought by the citizens of another State, or of a foreign state. Adhering
to the mere letter, it might be so; and so, in fact, the Supreme Court held in
Chisholm v. Georgia; but looking at the subject as Hamilton did, and as Mr.
Justice Iredell did, in the light of history and experience and the established
order of things, the views of the latter were clearly right . . . .
Id. at 13–14.
36. I cannot give my assent to many things said in the opinion. The comments
made upon the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia do not meet my approval.
They are not necessary to the determination of the present case. Besides, I am
of opinion that the decision in that case was based upon a sound interpretation
of the Constitution as that instrument then was.
Id. at 21 (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
To like effect, inviting our like acquiescence: “The Court’s unanimous [sic] decision in
Hans . . . firmly established that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a broad
constitutional principle of sovereign immunity.” Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486 (1987) (Powell, J., plurality opinion). We may say
“true” to this statement, if we wish, without conceding that the Eleventh Amendment
also “embodies” the “without its consent” qualification of the sovereign-immunity
principle. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
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Congress can modify, even abrogate, this State Sovereign Immunity in
the exercise of its Commerce power—a position rejected by a deeply
divided Court in Seminole Tribe38 and again in College Savings Bank.39
I would be willing to admit that Congress can modify or abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity in the exercise of its power under the Fourteenth
Amendment—a position assumed in many cases and explicitly taken by
the Court (not without dissent) in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.40 I would be
willing to admit that Congress could successfully insist that States must
“consent” to waive their sovereign immunity in return for federal
benefits—a position maintained articulately by the Court at least since
South Dakota v. Dole.41 I would even be willing to admit that Congress
can circumvent State Sovereign Immunity by authorizing suit on federal
claims against States in their own courts—a position narrowly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine.42
None of these qualifications on the Hans doctrine require further
discussion here. The Lapides decision neither takes up nor deals with
any of them. Instead, it deals with the “consent” element of the general
doctrine, and it holds that a State waives its immunity from the
maintenance of a suit against it in federal court by removing to that court
a suit initiated against it (by one of its own Citizens) in its own State
courts.43 Although quite a bit of vitriol has been spilled in recent years
38. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
39. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 682–83 (1999).
40. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
41. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). Dole holds that the federal
Spending Power permits Congress to impose conditions on State receipt of federal
benefits and funds as long as those conditions do not induce the States to engage in
activities that would be unconstitutional. Id. at 210–12. The proposition apparently
stems from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591–98 (1937) (upholding the
Social Security Act’s provisions that condition tax credits upon States’ adoption of
employment laws as required by the Act). If it wishes to require State waiver of
sovereign immunity as a condition to participation in federal benefits programs,
Congress must likely indicate this intent expressly and in some detail. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
42. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). Several if not all of these doctrinal
subtopics ultimately require resolution of the question whether Sovereign Immunity is a
constitutional or merely a common law principle. If the former, Congress would be
limited in attempting to alter State Sovereign Immunity in ways that otherwise would be
available to Congress if the doctrine were only a common law principle. Note, however,
that the Eleventh Amendment is not a required component in the resolution of any of
these subtopics.
43. See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the
Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167 (2003) (arguing that the
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over the “consent” element of the Sovereign Immunity doctrine—we
would expect federal courts to fumble with a “consent” condition from
time to time—none was reserved for this issue by our Supreme Court’s
members in Lapides, and I have no problems with this version of its
holding.
Nor am I particularly roused by the Court-sanctioned observation that
“we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms . . . .”44
“Standing for the presupposition” seems to me a rather different idea
than “Eleventh Amendment equals the presupposition, nothing more and
nothing less.” And the Eleventh Amendment, I maintain, does not
simply reinstate the general doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity. The
Eleventh Amendment also amends that doctrine with respect to the
claims it covers.
9. As the complete statement of the doctrine suggests, Sovereign
Immunity has nothing to do with a court’s “jurisdiction” in the usual
sense.45 Thus, a claimant brings suit against State, alleging a claim that
would be cognizable if brought against another citizen, in a federal court
(or state court) having original jurisdiction to entertain the suit; State
decides, by word or action, whether to consent to the suit; if State
consents, then the suit proceeds; if State does not consent, then the State
(successfully) moves for dismissal (although moving for summary
judgment would be better) on grounds of Sovereign Immunity.46

Supreme Court conflated two distinct notions of waiver—a state’s consent to suit, and
the effect of state officers’ actions—in mid-twentieth century in cases dealing with
Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment).
44. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). This language
was quoted verbatim in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996), Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999), aff’d,
527 U.S. 666 (1999), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999), and Fed. Mar. Comm’n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002).
45. Cf. CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
7 (1972) (“For Blackstone . . . the doctrine of sovereign immunity was simply a way of
stating that the king was not amenable to the jurisdiction of his own courts unless he
assented to such jurisdiction. However, the doctrine was not then understood as
relieving the sovereign of his legal obligations . . . .”); Eric S. Johnson, Note,
Unsheathing Alexander’s Sword: Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System
of Georgia, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1051, 1061–62 (2002) (arguing that confusion
surrounding Sovereign Immunity—which the author equates with the Eleventh
Amendment—results from its treatment as a subject matter jurisdiction concept rather
than as a personal jurisdiction concept).
46. See generally 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ITS
DIVISIONS, AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS, §§ 1:1–1:4 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the traditional
doctrine, its procedural nature, and nuances of each jurisdiction).
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And here is where we find obvious divergence between the Eleventh
Amendment and the Sovereign Immunity it presupposes. The Eleventh
Amendment’s text leaves no room for State consent to the suits falling
within its express scope. Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment is crafted,
not as an “immunity,” but rather as a limitation on the scope of the
federal judicial power. According to the Eleventh Amendment’s text,
the lawsuits falling within its scope belong, under no circumstances, in
federal court; attempts to adjudicate them, with or without a Statedefendant’s consent, would be ultra vires. Put differently, according to
text, Eleventh Amendment does not equal Sovereign Immunity, and
construing the Eleventh Amendment to equal Sovereign Immunity
would extend the federal judicial power to the lawsuits the Amendment
eliminates from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.
That the Eleventh Amendment does not equal Sovereign Immunity
seems easy enough to prove. Start simply by comparing the official
version of the Eleventh Amendment with one version of what it would
say if it were expressed in terms of Sovereign Immunity:
Official version: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
“Sovereign Immunity” version: “The Judicial power of the United
States shall extend to suits commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State, subject, however, to the State’s
consent to suit in the courts of the United States.”47
Then give a little credit to the intelligence of eighteenth century
legislators. That is, realize the likelihood that they would have used
something like the latter phraseology, rather than the phraseology
actually employed, if they had wanted the Eleventh Amendment to
reinstate State Sovereign Immunity exactly the way it was before
47. Compare yet another hypothetical version of a “Sovereign Immunity Eleventh
Amendment”: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to suits
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State, unless the State against which suit is
commenced or prosecuted consents to suit in the courts of the United States.” (Perhaps
you can begin to see why I like the hypothetical version in text better than other
hypothetical versions).
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Chisholm.48 Especially so, in the face of a Supreme Court that had just
finished demonstrating the tendency to interpret the Constitution literally
and in a way that aggrandized the federal government’s power.
Now consider the following scenarios, each of which is staged in a
vigilant federal district court acting with due regard to the constitutional
boundaries of its jurisdiction.
[1] Noncitizen of State brings a diversity lawsuit against State in
federal district court. Without waiting for further action by the
parties, the district court immediately dismisses the lawsuit as lying
outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts, citing the Eleventh
Amendment as authority for mandatory, sua sponte dismissal.49
[2] Citizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit in federal
district court against State. This lawsuit proceeds until State takes
action (motion to dismiss, for example, or motion for summary
judgment) that the court recognizes as an effective assertion of State’s
Sovereign Immunity.50
48. The starting points for analysis of Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment’s bar are actually opposite to each other. Immunity presupposes that
judicial power is vested but then exempts the immune subject from the exercise of that
power; hence, “[a]ny exemption from a duty, liability, or service of process; esp., such an
exemption granted to a public official.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (7th ed. 1999)
(emphasis added). The Eleventh Amendment insists that the judicial power is not vested
(or no longer will be vested) with respect to the litigation types it covers, and then limits
the authority of the federal government to extend the judicial power to reach those
litigation types.
49. States of the United States are never mentioned as potential parties for
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction extends to civil actions
“between (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of
a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a
State or of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000). Although Congress thought to
define “corporation” as a citizen or party for diversity jurisdiction, Id. § 1332(c)(1), it
defined “States” with no mention of them as parties, Id. § 1332(d). Thus, without
mention of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has not enabled the original jurisdiction
granted to district courts to authorize diversity suits involving the State as a party. See
also Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894):
A State is not a citizen. And, under the Judiciary Acts of the United States, it
is well settled that a suit between a State and a citizen . . . of another State is
not between citizens of different States; and that the Circuit Court of the
United States has no jurisdiction of it, unless it arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.
50. Or, in the alternative, the federal district court waits until return of service is
filed, then enters some sort of order proposing to dismiss the lawsuit in thirty days on
grounds of State sovereign immunity, unless within that time the State appears in the action
or otherwise manifests its consent to suit. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2004) (emphasis added). Although original jurisdiction of federal questions
has been vested in the federal district courts by act of Congress, the States may continue to
exercise any available exemption—such as Sovereign Immunity—from federal suit.
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[3] Noncitizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit in federal
district court against State. If the Eleventh Amendment abrogates
federal original jurisdiction with respect to federal question claims,
then the court follows the process indicated in [1] above. If the
Eleventh Amendment does not implicate federal original jurisdiction
over federal question claims, then the court follows the process
indicated in [2] above.
[4] Noncitizen of State brings a lawsuit against State in that
State’s courts (or, for that matter, in some other state’s courts),
alleging nonfederal claims. State removes the lawsuit to the federal
district court that would have original diversity jurisdiction of a
similar lawsuit if brought against a defendant who was not a State.
Without waiting for further action by the parties, the district court
immediately remands the lawsuit to the state court in which it
originated and erases all record of the lawsuit from its calendar,
because the lawsuit lies outside the original jurisdiction of the federal
district courts—and hence, outside their removal jurisdiction—citing
the Eleventh Amendment as authority for mandatory, sua sponte
remand.51
[5] Citizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit against State
in that State’s courts. State removes the lawsuit to the federal
district court of the district in which the state lawsuit was
commenced. This lawsuit proceeds on the court’s removal calendar
until State takes action (motion to dismiss, for example, or motion
51. To remove on grounds of diversity of citizenship, the federal district court to
which removal is made must have the original jurisdiction of the civil action that it
would have had if plaintiff had commenced the action in federal court rather than in state
court. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) (2000). Federal district courts, however, do not have original
jurisdiction over States in diversity actions, although they might in federal question
actions. Compare Postal Tel. Cable Co., 155 U.S. at 487 (stating that no district court
has original jurisdiction over States in diversity cases), with Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S.
449, 462–63 (1884) (allowing removal of a federal question claim brought by the State
against its own citizen in state court). See also Wisconsin Department of Corrections v.
Schacht, 524 U.S. 389–90 (1998) (citations omitted):
Where original jurisdiction rests upon Congress’ statutory grant of “diversity
jurisdiction,” this Court has held that one claim against one nondiverse
defendant destroys that original jurisdiction. . . . But, where original jurisdiction
rests upon the Statute’s grant of “arising under” jurisdiction, the Court has
assumed that the presence of a potential Eleventh Amendment bar with respect
to one claim, has not destroyed original jurisdiction over the case. . . . Since a
federal court would have original jurisdiction to hear this case had Schacht
originally filed it there, the defendants may remove the case from state to
federal courts. See [28 U.S.C.] § 1441(a).
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for summary judgment) that the court recognizes as an effective
assertion of State’s Sovereign Immunity.52
[6] Noncitizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit against
State in that State’s courts (or, for that matter, in some other state’s
courts). State removes the lawsuit to the federal district court in the
district in which the state lawsuit was commenced. If the Eleventh
Amendment abrogates federal original jurisdiction with respect to
federal question claims, then the court follows the process indicated in
[4] above. If the Eleventh Amendment does not implicate federal
original jurisdiction over federal question claims, then the court
follows the process indicated in [5] above.
So far, so good—in Lapides, Georgia removed an action commenced
in its own courts by one of its Citizens on federal question grounds.
Thus, Lapides presents a scenario [5] case, which implicates Sovereign
Immunity and not the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court was
entirely correct to welcome the case on its removal calendar. If we
admit the view that, by removing, the State consented to suit in federal
court, then the Supreme Court was uncontroversially correct in affirming
the District Court’s refusal to dismiss and in reversing the Court of
Appeals’ contrary view. Share my short-lived comfort with this nice,
clean, unanimous Supreme Court decision.
10. Eleventh Amendment, Sovereign Immunity: What difference does
it make, as long as the State always succeeds in getting a dismissal of the
lawsuit commenced or prosecuted against it in federal court? The
question is an entirely legitimate one to ask, especially since States have
almost never lost when either theory has been put in play,53 and in recent
years the Court has overruled or severely limited several of the
precedents in which States lost.54
52. Or, in the alternative, the federal district court posits that the act of removal
constitutes an effective (perhaps irrevocable) consent by the State to suit in federal court
(or, in the alternative, an effective waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court).
53. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760, 769
(2002) (holding that sovereign immunity precluded the Federal Maritime Commission
from adjudicating a claim against a state-run port); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
374 (2001) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not subject States to
suit in federal court). The Eleventh Circuit correctly decided Garrett on sovereign
immunity grounds, but the Supreme Court incorrectly decided it on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. But see Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899, 906 (2004)
(rejecting State’s argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement of federal
consent decrees entered into by state officials); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613,
624 (2002) (holding that State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily
removing case to federal court).
54. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
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I have just suggested that one difference lies in the amount of judicial
resources that must be spent in achieving that dismissal. A true Eleventh
Amendment case requires only that the federal court examine a
Noncitizen’s lawsuit to determine (1) if a State is being sued and (2) if
the Eleventh Amendment applies to the suit—and, if so, then immediately
to dismiss it. A true Sovereign Immunity case requires that the federal
court determine (1) whether a sovereign is being sued, and (2) whether
the sovereign manifests consent to suit—that is, to wait for a valid
manifestation of State consent or waiver (or its opposite)—and then
exercise its jurisdiction in continuing with or dismissing the suit
according to the manifestation. The reason for this difference is that,
among all the types of lawsuits against States that fall within the Article
III original jurisdiction of the federal courts, true Eleventh Amendment
lawsuits fall outside the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, while
true Sovereign Immunity lawsuits fall within the federal original
jurisdiction.
11. The reason for all the confusion is that the United States Supreme
Court often has garbled “Eleventh Amendment” and “Sovereign
Immunity.” Indeed, one who reads the Court’s recent decisions can
easily begin to suspect that the Court waves perfunctorily at the Eleventh
Amendment to provide a kind of cover for the State Sovereign Immunity
that lurks off to its side. All this obfuscation in a decision the State is
about to win anyway.55
Take the question whether non-State “sovereigns”—like foreign nations
and Indian Tribes—are to be treated as Noncitizens for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment. If they are Noncitizens, then their lawsuits
against States lie outside the federal judicial power. If they are
sovereigns rather than Noncitizens, then the State they are suing has
Sovereign Immunity to invoke. At least in the Supreme Court, these
lawsuits have all resulted in dismissal of proceedings against the State.
The leading case, Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, ambiguously
holds: (1) “foreign states” are not Noncitizens within the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment; (2) the Eleventh Amendment erects an “absolute
bar” to “suits against a State, without her consent, brought by citizens of
55. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 12–13 (2002) (arguing that when the
obfuscation of Sovereign Immunity is stripped away, most of the Supreme Court’s
decisions—which almost always favor States over individuals—lack any constitutional
basis).
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another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State”; (3) the
Eleventh Amendment also “[s]upersed[es] the decision in Chisholm v.
Georgia,” with result that the “‘entire judicial power granted by the
Constitution’ does not embrace authority to entertain such suits in the
absence of the State’s consent”; (4) the Article III exceptions to (3), that
is, federal jurisdiction over suits between States of the United States and
suits between the United States and one of its States, are “inherent in the
constitutional plan” as a “necessary feature of the formation of a more
perfect Union”; and (5) thus, State Sovereign Immunity (nonamenability
to suit unless consented to) applies to a foreign state’s suit against a
State.56 The meaning of the “absolute bar” passage in (2) is
ambiguous—what sort of “absolute bar” would have a “consent”
qualification? It is also unnecessary to the unanimous Court’s decision
denying Monaco leave to file its suit.57
When the Court returns to the Monaco doctrine in a series of suits
brought by Indian Tribes against States in federal court, it begins by
quoting the Eleventh Amendment, then moves directly to Sovereign
Immunity,58 and ends by authoring an incomprehensible mish-mash of
the two otherwise distinct concepts.59 The States always win in these
decisions. If Indian Tribes are Noncitizens for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment, then the States would always win and the Indian Tribes
would know to bring their suits against States in state court. If Indian
Tribes are not Noncitizens for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment
(because they are sovereigns or, perhaps, because they are Citizens of
the State they are suing), then their suits are covered by State Sovereign
Immunity, an immunity the State can waive, and Indian Tribes can
continue to take a chance on suing States in federal court.60 What stands
56. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328–32 (1934) (citations
omitted).
57. Because the Monaco Court jumps tracks from Eleventh Amendment analysis
to Sovereign Immunity analysis, its conclusion does not quite follow from its premises.
The Court could have reached the same conclusion more quickly and clearly—without
any dishonesty—if it had ignored the Eleventh Amendment and instead stated that the
State retains its Sovereign Immunity and is thus exempt from suit by a foreign state (in
the absence of certain exceptions to the exemption, such as the State’s knowing consent).
58. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779–82 (1991); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55 (1996).
59. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267–69, 287–88 (1997).
60. Until the early twentieth century, it was clear that Indian Tribes were neither
citizens of the State in which they were located, nor citizens of a foreign state. Iowa
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987). In 1924, Congress made all Indians
born in the United States citizens of the United States, as well as of their respective
states, for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Id. at 18 n.10 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401).
Nonetheless, when a Tribe sues a State, it sues as a sovereign. Tribes also are not
citizens of a State for diversity jurisdiction purposes. Id. Several circuits have wrestled
with the question of whether a Tribe even falls within the scope of the Eleventh
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in the way of this rather straightforward distinction between the Eleventh
Amendment’s jurisdictional bar and the vagaries of State Sovereign
Immunity? Nothing, except the Supreme Court’s confusion of the two
concepts.
Or take the question of whether Congress can abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in the exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment power. Some
may consider bizarre the Rehnquist Court’s idea that the Eleventh
Amendment blocks Congress from abrogating State Sovereign Immunity
by resort to its Article I powers but not from doing so by resort to its
Fourteenth Amendment power.61 My point is that the Court’s distinction
does not actually rest on the Eleventh Amendment; instead, it rests on
whether the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to abrogate
State Sovereign Immunity, and if so, then within what limits. Fitzpatrick
and Atascadero, the leading cases on Congress’s authority to provide
private causes of action against States in the exercise of its Fourteenth
Amendment power, involved Citizens as plaintiffs and were not Eleventh
Amendment cases.62 Seminole Tribe, the first decision to broach the
distinction between “Article I powers” and “Fourteenth Amendment powers,”
quotes the Eleventh Amendment and then clearly spends the rest of its
time on State Sovereign Immunity.63 (And, if what I have just said about
the nonapplication of Eleventh Amendment to sovereigns makes sense,
then Seminole Tribe involves not even a whisper of an Eleventh
Amendment problem). The State defendants win in all these cases.
Florida Prepaid does involve an Eleventh Amendment problem, and
the Court does seem to hold that Congress is not limited by the Eleventh
Amendment in the exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment authority.64
Although I wish the Court had simply ordered dismissal instead of using
Florida Prepaid as its vehicle for declaring that State Sovereign
Immunity was stronger than the Patent Remedy Clarification Act, my
argument here does not depend on confession of error on this point by
Amendment. See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135,
1140–41 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that Tribes were “stateless persons” but nonetheless
within the Eleventh Amendment’s bar). See generally Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional
Approach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 434–35 n.201
(2003) (discussing the complexities of tribal citizenship).
61. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 72–73.
62. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 236–38 (1985); Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448, 455–56 (1976).
63. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54–73.
64. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 637, 646–48 (1999), aff’d, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
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the Court. So be it if the Fourteenth Amendment amends the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment. (And again, the State won in Florida Prepaid).
12. Did the Lapides Court have to refer to the Eleventh Amendment
in concluding that Georgia had consented to federal jurisdiction by
removing Lapides’ lawsuit to federal court? Probably, out of deference
to the parties and lower courts. The parties had framed Georgia’s
postremoval motion to dismiss by resort to the Eleventh Amendment.
The parties had framed the issues on appeal with reference to the
Eleventh Amendment. The lower federal courts had resolved the issues
with reference to the Eleventh Amendment. Circuits had split in their
attempts to answer this precise question in the shadow of the Supreme
Court’s fluctuating jurisprudence on State Sovereign/“Eleventh
Amendment” Immunity. And the High Court itself had granted Lapides’
petition for certiorari “to decide whether ‘a state waive[s] its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it
removes a case to federal court.’”65
The short—and correct—answer to Lapides’ question is that (1) a
State has no “Eleventh Amendment immunity” to waive, but (2) the
State’s removal in this case did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment
because the underlying state court proceedings had been initiated by a
Citizen of the defendant State. This was not the answer the Lapides
Court provided.
Did the Lapides Court feel the constraint of precedent in discussing
Eleventh Amendment “immunity”? Maybe, but it shouldn’t have.
Although the Supreme Court precedents are numerous in which
Sovereign Immunity problems are discussed as though they included
Eleventh Amendment problems, the holdings that invite the Lapides
Court’s “immunity” analysis are almost nonexistent. The Lapides Court
cites Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon as its example for the
proposition that “[a] State remains free to waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court.”66 But Atascadero,
like nearly all the other decisions that could have been cited for a similar
proposition, involves a suit initiated in federal court by a Citizen against
his own State—a Hans v. Louisiana, Sovereign Immunity case, not an
Eleventh Amendment case.
The Lapides Court uses Clark v. Barnard as its main stand-in for its
proposition that “more than a century ago this Court indicated that a
State’s voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”67 But Clark’s “indication” was no
65.
66.
67.

1080

Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citation omitted).
Id. at 618 (citing Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238).
Id. at 619 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)).

HORTON.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1057, 2004]

8/22/2019 10:29 AM

Lapides v. Board of Regents
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

such thing. After sidestepping the Rhode Island Treasurer’s argument
that the federal suit brought against him was actually brought against his
State “contrary to the Eleventh Amendment,” Clark held that Rhode
Island’s subsequent voluntary intervention in the lawsuit amounted to a
waiver of its sovereign immunity.68 The Eleventh Amendment was
irrelevant to this issue because the Amendment had nothing to say about
litigation initiated by a State in federal court, and the Massachusetts
plaintiffs in Clark had carefully avoided suing the State of Rhode Island.
Clark holds as much, and heads a consistent line of similar “voluntary
appearance” or “consent” precedents, some of which refer to the
Eleventh Amendment and some of which do not. None of this matters,
because, like Clark (and Lapides), these cases do not involve suits
initiated by a Noncitizen against the State. Regardless of any careless—and
superfluous—language in them to the contrary, these cases either
involve the State as the federal-court claimant or deal with problems
implicating State Sovereign Immunity (and its waiver), not the Eleventh
Amendment’s elimination of federal jurisdiction over suits commenced
or prosecuted by Noncitizens against States.
Did the Lapides Court have to refer to the Eleventh Amendment after
it arrogantly converted the case Georgia removed on federal question
grounds into a case devoid of federal questions?69 No. Indeed, it had no
legitimate business doing so. First, Lapides was a Georgia citizen, not a
“Citizen[] of another State,” bringing claims against Georgia; so the
Eleventh Amendment is irrelevant to this litigation. Second, Lapides’
federal claims provided the only basis for removal; if they proved so
bogus that a court could simply dismiss them sua sponte, then one must
wonder how Georgia could have been made to stay in federal court after
those claims were dismissed. After all, Article III—not the Eleventh
Amendment—refuses to recognize federal original jurisdiction over
nondiverse litigation involving only state law questions.

68. Clark, 108 U.S. at 447–48.
69. It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law
claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from
state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides’ only federal claim against
the State arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim seeks only monetary
damages, and we have held that a state is not a “person” against whom a § 1983
claim for money damages might be asserted.
Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617.
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13. Hans, Clark, and Atascadero, then, neither contradict my argument,
nor support the Lapides Nine. A handful of other decisions, however, prove
more formidable opponents. I briefly identify and respond to them here.
(a) New Hampshire v. Louisiana seems to be the first Supreme Court
decision to conflate the Eleventh Amendment with Sovereign Immunity.70
During Reconstruction, Louisiana and other Confederate States encountered
considerable trouble in paying their debts, and passed various fiats that
discounted or eliminated them. In lawsuit after lawsuit brought by
creditors, the U.S. Supreme Court supported these States’ behavior.
New Hampshire and New York attempted to help out their own citizens
by passing legislation under which the citizens could assign their
Louisiana bonds and coupons to the respective States.
With these assignments in hand, New Hampshire and New York
commenced suit against Louisiana in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking a
declaration that the bonds evidencing the debts were valid, that
Louisiana was prohibited from diverting the tax funds that had been
earmarked to pay these debts, and that the actions taken by Louisiana
unconstitutionally impaired that State’s own obligations under its own
contracts. “No one can look at the pleadings and testimony in these
cases,” a unanimous Supreme Court found, “without being satisfied,
beyond all doubt, that they were in legal effect commenced, and are now
prosecuted, solely by the owners of the bonds and coupons.”71 It
followed that the Eleventh Amendment required dismissal of the suit:
“The language of the [Eleventh] amendment is, in effect, that the judicial
power of the United States shall not extend to any suit commenced or
prosecuted by citizens of one State against another State.”72 But on the
way to its judgment of dismissal, the Court also stated:
The evident purpose of the [Eleventh] amendment, so promptly proposed and
finally adopted, was to prohibit all suits against a State by or for citizens of
other States, or aliens, without the consent of the State to be sued, and, in our
opinion, one State cannot create a controversy with another State, within the
meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by
assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other State to its citizens.73

This statement was a casual one, unaccompanied by any visible means
of support. The statement was gratuitous; once the Court found that
Noncitizens rather than their State were the true plaintiffs, the terms of
the Eleventh Amendment were sufficient to bar the suits. Indeed, neither
the fact nor the quality of Louisiana’s refusal to consent to the lawsuit
was the subject of inquiry in the Court’s opinion. And, in light of the
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Court’s statement about the Eleventh Amendment’s “effect” a few
paragraphs earlier in its opinion, the Court’s statement of the amendment’s
“evident purpose” here proves rather vague. This last quoted passage in
New Hampshire v. Louisiana has seldom been treated as its holding in
subsequent cases.74
(b) Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury contradicts my
argument in the following passage: “Where . . . an action is authorized
by statute against a state officer in his official capacity and constituting
an action against the state, the Eleventh Amendment operates to bar suit
except in so far as the statute waives state immunity from suit.”75
Otherwise, the decision supports my argument.
Ford Motor, a Noncitizen of Indiana, commenced its lawsuit in
federal district court against a State department and the members of its
board, seeking a refund of state income taxes it had been charged for
its sales in the State on the grounds that the tax violated the Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. An
Indiana statute established a procedure by which a taxpayer could
petition the department for such a refund and authorized “suit against
the department in any court of competent jurisdiction” in the event the
petition was denied.76 The State’s Attorney General, apparently under
the impression that the State’s statute authorized suit in federal court,
successfully defended the federal action in both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals. After Ford Motor’s petition for certiorari had
74. Of the few Supreme Court decisions referring to New Hampshire v. Louisiana,
most focus on when a State may invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. For
examples of Supreme Court opinions noting that a State may not invoke original
jurisdiction unless it is a real party in interest see Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7–8
(2001); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737–39 (1981); Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258–59 n.12 (1972); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387,
392–96 (1938); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 310 (1904); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 231–32 (1901); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900).
Discussion of the Eleventh Amendment in these cases is limited to the statement that
States may not circumvent the Eleventh Amendment and create original jurisdiction in
the federal courts by suing on behalf of their citizens. In other words, “original
jurisdiction against a state can only be invoked by another state acting in its sovereign
capacity,” New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 372 (1953), and discussions of New
Hampshire tend to focus on which facts either show or belie a state’s interest as a
sovereign in a particular suit.
75. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945), overruled on other
grounds, Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622–23 (2002). And again: “[The
Eleventh Amendment] denies to the federal courts authority to entertain a suit brought by
private parties against a state without its consent.” Ford Motor Co., 232 U.S. at 464.
76. Id. at 461 n.3.
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been granted by the Supreme Court, the State invoked the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to federal suit.77
A unanimous Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the action to the District Court “with directions to dismiss the
complaint for want of consent by the state to this suit.”78 In doing so, the
Ford Motor Court held: (1) Ford’s lawsuit “against the department and
the individuals as the board constitutes an action against the State of
Indiana” rather than against state officers in their individual capacity.79
(2) Although the state statute in question authorized a lawsuit against the
State, the authorization was “a waiver of state immunity from suit in
state courts only,”80 and “no properly authorized executive or administrative
officer of the state has waived the state’s immunity to suit in the federal
courts.”81 And, most important, (3) despite having litigated the matter
through two tiers of federal courts before invoking the Eleventh
Amendment, the State’s invocation was timely: “The Eleventh
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on
federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will
consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even
though urged for the first time in this Court.”82
Not all the language, but certainly all the decision, of the Court fully
supports my argument. A State has no authority to redefine the contours
of the federal judicial power. The Eleventh Amendment contours the
federal judicial power to exclude Noncitizens’ suits against States in
federal court. That the lower federal courts and the parties in Ford
Motor had neglected these truths (until reaching the Supreme Court) did
not abrogate these truths. The Supreme Court’s vacation following
order of dismissal of the lower courts’ decisions, upon discovery of the
error, is entirely consistent with the Eleventh Amendment’s text.
(c) At first glance, the two College Savings Bank cases contradict my
argument. A New Jersey corporation commenced two lawsuits in New
Jersey’s U.S. District Court against a Florida state agency, claiming
patent infringement in one suit and unfair competition in violation of
federal law in the other. In the patent infringement case, the Court
77. “The objection to petitioner’s suit as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment
was first made and argued by Indiana in this Court.” Id. at 467.
78. Id. at 470.
79. Id. at 463. “Petitioner’s right to maintain this action in federal court depends,
first, upon whether the action is against the State of Indiana or against an individual.” Id.
at 462.
80. Id. at 465 (citing the Court’s construction of a “similar provision of an
Oklahoma tax refund statute” in Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)).
81. Id. at 469 (the penultimate statement concluding the Court’s analysis on pages
467–68).
82. Id. at 467.
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quoted the Eleventh Amendment, transited immediately to State
Sovereign Immunity, reiterated that Congress had limited authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate State Sovereign Immunity
(probably also the Eleventh Amendment), and held that Congress’s
attempt in the Patent Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 to abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity (possibly also the Eleventh Amendment) was
unsuccessful.83
In the unfair competition case, the Court held that “the sovereign
immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the
State’s activities in interstate commerce,” and therefore that “the federal
courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the
State of Florida.”84 The holding seems at least marginally nonsensical,
because “sovereign immunity” is not a doctrine about jurisdiction in the
usual sense. The point here is that College Savings Bank could be a decision
about the Eleventh Amendment, but seems much more comprehensible
as a decision about the implied constitutional doctrine of State Sovereign
Immunity established in Hans v. Louisiana. Thus, reference to Eleventh
Amendment practically disappears after the third paragraph of the
Court’s decision. The decision’s second paragraph begins with allusion
to Chisholm v. Georgia and the reaction that led to the Eleventh
Amendment, followed by this passage:
Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought
against one State by citizens of another State or foreign state, we have long
recognized that the Eleventh Amendment accomplished much more: It
repudiated the central premise of Chisholm that the jurisdictional heads of
Article III superseded the sovereign immunity that the States possessed
before entering the Union. This has been our understanding of the
Amendment since the landmark case of Hans v. Louisiana . . . .
While this immunity from suit is not absolute, we have recognized only
two circumstances in which an individual may sue a State. First, Congress
may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment—an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh
Amendment and specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer . . . . Second, a State may waive its sovereign
83. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 634–37, 639–40 (1999). The suggestion in this case is that the Court may be
starting to revisit the idea that the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal question as well as
diversity cases; or put differently, that diversity cases are covered by the Eleventh
Amendment (and by Sovereign Immunity in the absence of the Eleventh Amendment),
while federal question cases of all sorts are covered by State Sovereign Immunity.
84. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 691 (1999).

1085

HORTON.DOC

8/22/2019 10:29 AM

immunity by consenting to suit. Clark v. Barnard . . . . This case turns on
whether either of these two circumstances is present.85

The College Savings Bank Court, which abrogated the “constructive
consent” doctrine as an exception to State Sovereign Immunity,86 seems
to have understood and respected the argument I am making here. My
evidence supporting this inference comes from the court’s footnote in
response to the dissent:
It is difficult to square JUSTICE BREYER’s reliance upon the distinction that
the present case involves a federal question (and is therefore not explicitly
covered by the Eleventh Amendment) . . . with its professed fidelity to Hans,
the whole point of which was that the sovereign immunity reflected in (rather
than created by) the Eleventh Amendment transcends the narrow text of the
Amendment itself.87

In any event, the two College Savings Bank decisions turn out not to
impair my argument, but rather to strengthen it by eliminating one set of
possible exceptions (Congress’s power to abrogate the Amendment
under Article I, and the “constructive consent” doctrine) and by severely
85. Id. at 669–70 (citations omitted). None of the precedents cited in these two
paragraphs is an Eleventh Amendment case. I have discussed Hans, Fitzpatrick, and
Clark previously in this article. The other cases cited in this passage are Ex parte New
York, 256 U.S. 490, 496–98 (1921) (action by citizen against State; State Sovereign
Immunity bars a plaintiff’s admiralty claim in federal court against an unconsenting
State); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330–32 (1934) (although the
Eleventh Amendment only bars suits by individual Noncitizens against States, State
Sovereign Immunity bars suits brought by foreign sovereigns in federal court against
unconsenting States); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984) (action by Citizens against State; State Sovereign Immunity bars the assertion of
federal question claims in federal court against unconsenting States):
The Amendment’s language overruled the particular result in Chisholm, but
this Court has recognized that its greater significance lies in its affirmation that
the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial
authority in Art. III . . . . In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a
constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III.
Id.; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 44–45 (1996) (involving action by Citizen or
sovereign against State; neither the Eleventh Amendment nor State Sovereign Immunity
can be unilaterally abrogated by Congress in the exercise of its Article I Commerce Power).
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article
III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition . . . which it confirms.” . . . For over a century we have reaffirmed
that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States “was not
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States.” Hans . . . .
Id. at 54.
86. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676–87 (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184 (1964)). As the majority obliquely points out, most if not all of the Eleventh
Amendment’s piece of the “constructive waiver” doctrine had already been eliminated
by Seminole Tribe. Id.
87. Id. at 687–88 n.5 (emphasis added).
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limiting the other possible exception (Congress’s power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment).
Hardly any of the language in these decisions, and none of their results,
contradict my argument for the independence of the Eleventh
Amendment’s jurisdictional bar from the defense of State Sovereign
Immunity.
14. I now confront four problems that are more substantive in character
for my textualist view of the Eleventh Amendment, and for my thesis on
the separation of Eleventh Amendment from State Sovereign Immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment and Interstate Compacts. A few cases, led
by Petty v. Tennessee–Missouri Bridge Commission, hold that Congress
does not behave unconstitutionally when it conditions its approval of an
Interstate Compact on relinquishment by the Compact’s State members
of their sovereign immunity.88 Assuming these precedents continue to
state the law, I am not troubled in reconciling them with the Eleventh
Amendment. These cases all seem to involve a victim’s suit for
damages or compensation against an interstate commission or board.89
From appearances, the victim seems to be a Citizen of one of the State
members to the Compact.90 No matter—Interstate Compacts do not
create new States, and suit against a multistate commission doesn’t have
to be construed as suit against any particular State.
If, nonetheless, the Eleventh Amendment is understood to foreclose
damages actions against multistate Compacts, then only actions brought
in the federal courts would be foreclosed. On my view, Congress has no
power to negotiate a State’s waiver of the Eleventh Amendment (at least,
not in the exercise of its Article I powers), but it does have power to
negotiate a State’s waiver of its sovereign immunity. As a result of such
a deal, the courts of Compact States would be made available for redress
of injuries—as well as the federal courts, at least for a federal question
lawsuit by a Citizen against the Compact member that is his or her State.
88. Petty v. Tenn.–Mo. Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
89. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)
(involving suit for damages brought by injured railroad employees); Port Auth. Trans–
Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 301 (1990) (involving suit by injured railroad
employees). In both cases the railroad was owned and operated by the states of New
Jersey and New York.
90. Neither Hess nor Feeney mention the citizenship of the railroad workers;
however, it seems likely that they resided in either New York or New Jersey as they
worked on a railroad that went between the two. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 33; Feeney, 495
U.S. at 301.
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State as Plaintiff, Noncitizen as Counterclaimant. The Eleventh
Amendment does not speak to States as litigation commencers or
prosecutors. Sometimes States bring suit against Noncitizens in federal
court. Does the Eleventh Amendment preclude these defendant Noncitizens
from counterclaiming against the plaintiff States? Answering this question
cannot legitimately depend on considerations of “efficiency in litigation”
or on the extent to which worship of transaction/occurrence civil
litigation demands the presence of compulsory (but not permissive)
counterclaims.91 The answer does seem to depend on the depth of the
principle, quoted by the Lapides Court, that “where a State voluntarily
becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial
determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of
its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh
Amendment.”92 Lapides, however, does not involve a Noncitizen, and
thus is not an Eleventh Amendment case.
The Eleventh Amendment does not tell us whether filing a counterclaim
is the equivalent of commencing a lawsuit. If assertion of a counterclaim
amounts to “commencement or prosecution” of a “suit,” then the Noncitizen
defendant’s counterclaim is barred from the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts. If not, then the issue goes away for the Eleventh
Amendment and remains an issue for the Sovereign Immunity doctrine
that a State cannot be sued without its consent (“voluntarily becom[ing]
a party to a cause and submit[ting] its rights for judicial determination”).93
91. Federal courts have confronted problems that threaten transaction/occurrencebased litigation, and have resolved them in favor of honoring the limits of their
jurisdiction. For example, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The plaintiff who brings state
securities fraud claims against a nondiverse defendant in the state courts, and a parallel
Rule 10b-5 claim against the same defendant in federal district court, is understood to be
entitled to maintain both lawsuits. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367
(1996).
92. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002) (quoting Gunter v. Atl.
Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)). In Gunter, South Carolina filed a suit
in federal district court to collect taxes against a Noncitizen railroad. The State lost and
was enjoined from taxing the railroad. Over ten years later, a successor bought the
railroad and South Carolina filed a suit in state court to collect taxes from the successor.
While the state prosecution was pending, the railroad sought and obtained a federal
injunction against the attorney general of South Carolina from prosecuting the case,
based on res judicata. This second injunction was filed as an ancillary case to the
original suit from ten years before. The State claimed that the injunction violated the
Eleventh Amendment because the attorney general represented the State’s interests (by
legislative authorization). Gunter, 200 U.S. at 277–82. The court held: (1) the attorney
general was not the State; (2) to the extent that the State was really a party, the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar the suit because the original action—from ten years before—had
been commenced by the State. Id. at 273–74. For this second holding, Gunter relied on
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883). Id. at 284. For discussion of Clark, see supra
notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
93. Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284; see also Clark, 108 U.S. at 447–48 (dismissing the
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In any event, relegating a Noncitizen defendant’s claim to the state
courts for its prosecution—with only a “set off” or some other defensive
version of the claim admitted in federal court—would not signal the end
of the world, or even the end of an otherwise compulsory counterclaim.94
Negotiated Waiver or Consent. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court
has indicated that States can negotiate away their “Eleventh Amendment
immunity” and, accordingly, be deemed to have “consented” to suit in
federal court, in return for the receipt of Congress’s largess. Then, in
one contentious decision after another, the Court has whittled away at
the concept of State “consent,” has demanded ever increasing evidence
of State consent, and has insisted on ever clearer manifestation of
congressional intent to extract State consent.95 During this period, the
State defendants have never been made to stay in federal court in the
lawsuits paying lip service to this principle. Indeed, only two of these
cases involved Noncitizen plaintiffs and thus fell within the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment.96 The decisions in these two cases, as well as in
all the other cases dating back to Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
have fostered considerable tension between Congress and the Supreme
Court.97
The two College Savings Bank decisions, and not Atascadero, are the
most problematic pre-Lapides decisions for my argument. Once the
Eleventh Amendment claim immediately and moving into a discussion of whether
sovereign immunity bars the case).
94. Indeed, Justice Breyer—who authored the Lapides opinion—seems to have
made this point in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht:
[W]here original jurisdiction rests upon the Statute’s grant of “arising under”
jurisdiction, the Court has assumed that the presence of a potential Eleventh
Amendment bar with respect to one claim, has not destroyed original
jurisdiction over the case . . . . Since a federal court would have original
jurisdiction to hear this case had Schacht originally filed it there, the defendants
may remove the case from state to federal courts. See [28 U.S.C.] § 1441(a).
524 U.S. 381, 389–90 (1998) (citations omitted).
95. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–12 (1987); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 474–74 (1987); Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305–06; Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627, 675–87 (1999), aff’d, 527
U.S. 666 (1999).
96. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 670–71; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 630.
97. Immediately after the two College Savings Bank decisions, members of
Congress set about to overturn them. Bills to that effect have been introduced repeatedly
in Congress since 2000. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of
2002, S. 2031, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002) (introduced by Senators Leahy and Brownback,
March 19, 2002).

1089

HORTON.DOC

8/22/2019 10:29 AM

proposition is accepted that the Eleventh Amendment applies to
Noncitizens’ federal question claims, as well as to their diversity claims
against a State,98 they fall clearly within the terms of the Amendment’s
barricade against federal original jurisdiction. On my argument, they
should have been dismissed sua sponte by the district court—but for
sloppy precedents on “Congress’s abrogation of Eleventh Amendment”
and “State constructive waiver.” As I previously pointed out, the
Supreme Court used the two College Savings Bank decisions to overrule
those precedents. The references to “Eleventh Amendment immunity”
in the College Savings Bank decisions contradict the argument I am
making here, as do the parties’ and federal courts’ efforts and expense in
enabling these decisions, but the results in these decisions do not.
Congress and the States might well control the contours of State
Sovereign Immunity. Congress may well be able to exact a State’s
waiver of sovereign immunity in return for extension of the federal
government’s benefits. If a State abides by its bargain, it will offer its
own courts for redress of claims regarding those benefits, and will
submit to suits by its own Citizens commenced and prosecuted in federal
district court. (I note in passing that States seldom are required to
provide, for example, federal employment or welfare benefits to
Noncitizens). If a State reneges on the bargain it is constitutionally
authorized to make, then the United States can sue it in federal court, or
can withdraw the benefits it has conditioned on waiver. In these
bargaining situations, however, neither Congress nor the States should
legitimately be understood to control the contours of the Eleventh
Amendment, because the Amendment does not offer “immunity,” but
rather removes a class of lawsuits from the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
15. Lapides involved none of Eleventh Amendment problems I have
just discussed. Indeed, a properly understood Lapides does not involve
the Eleventh Amendment at all. The case does, however, involve
removal by the State of claims originally commenced against it in its
own courts. And the case, in treating the Eleventh Amendment as
though it equaled State Sovereign Immunity—that is, that “[a] State
remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a
federal court”99—clearly holds that a State is entitled to avail itself of the
federal removal jurisdiction in lawsuits brought against it in its own
courts. If Lapides means what it so clearly says in the context of a
Citizen’s action against his State in his State’s courts, then “Eleventh
98. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476–88
(1987); see supra section 3, pages 6–10.
99. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 618.
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Amendment equals waivable State Sovereign Immunity” must apply to
Noncitizen suits as well as to Citizen suits. (After all, the Eleventh
Amendment actually mentions Noncitizen suits; it says nothing about
Citizen suits).
A good general proposition is that a lawsuit commenced in state court
is removable to federal courts if the lawsuit, as it looks when the
removal occurs, could have been commenced in federal court in the first
place.100 So let’s make Lapides an Alabama citizen, instead of the
Georgia citizen he actually was. Noncitizen Lapides sues Georgia in a
proper Georgia state court. Under these circumstances, defendant Georgia
may remove the suit to federal district court if Lapides is asserting a
federal claim against it. That is so because “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”101 Removal, though voluntary on
Georgia’s part, does not make Georgia the plaintiff and Lapides the
defendant in the federal action. Alabama Lapides did not commence his
action in federal court, but, upon Georgia’s removal of the action to “the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending,”102 he will be the Noncitizen
who is prosecuting his federal question “suit in law or equity” against a
State in apparent contradiction of the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.
No matter, because, according to a unanimous United States Supreme
Court decision, the Eleventh Amendment does not mean what it says;
instead, it means waivable State Sovereign Immunity.
Georgia might not be able to remove Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit if it
asserts only state law claims. That is so because the removal statute
states that such lawsuits “shall be removable only if none of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which such action is brought.”103 At this point, the question
becomes whether a State, as a defendant sued in its own courts on
nonfederal claims, is a citizen of itself for purposes of removal. The
Lapides Court seems to indicate that a State is not a citizen of itself for
this purpose, because it unanimously allowed the state claims Lapides
was prosecuting against Georgia to remain in the district court after
effectively dismissing his bogus federal claim:
100.
101.
102.
103.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) & 1446(b) (2000).
Id. § 1331.
Id. § 1441(a).
Id. § 1441(b).
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[T]his case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. . . .
Nonetheless, Lapides’ state-law tort claims against the State remain pending in
Federal District Court . . . and the law commits the remand question, ordinarily a
matter of discretion, to the Federal District Court for decision in the first instance. . . .
Hence, the question presented is not moot. We possess the legal power here to
answer that question as limited to the state-law context just described.104

So far we have been working through Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit as
though he had initiated it in Georgia’s state courts. The Lapides analysis,
however, does not require the complications of a removal step; it only
requires a State to engage in an effective waiver of its Eleventh
Amendment equals Sovereign Immunity. Removal is permitted only of
lawsuits, commenced in state court “of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction.”105 Therefore, in permitting
removal by Georgia of Georgia Lapides’ lawsuit, Lapides must hold,
contrary to the text of the Eleventh Amendment, that the federal district
courts have original jurisdiction of Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit, subject
only to Georgia’s waiver or consent.
According to the Lapides analysis, then, Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit,
expressing federal claims against Georgia, clearly can be commenced in
federal district court. How about Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit expressing only
state claims against Georgia? Here, although we have clear diversity—the
same diversity as that involved in Chisholm v. Georgia—we may
encounter difficulty. That is so because the original diversity jurisdiction of
the federal district courts is defined by a statute that, in keeping with
what almost everyone thought the Eleventh Amendment said before
Lapides, does not specifically provide for a Noncitizen’s civil action
against a State.106 And thus, the implication in Lapides that a State is not
a citizen of itself, latent in the Court’s decision to leave the action the
State removed in the district court when only state claims remained,
must extend at least this far:
(1) Contrary to what it seems to say, the Eleventh Amendment
does not serve to contour the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Instead, it simply gives States an immunity from suit in federal court
that a State is free to waive.
104. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617–18.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens
of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different
States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties;
and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States.
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(2) Contrary to what it seems to say, the Eleventh Amendment
makes no distinction between Citizens and Noncitizens for purposes
of federal original jurisdiction of their lawsuits against States.
(3) Lawsuits including federal claims lie within the original
jurisdiction of the federal district courts and can be commenced
against States by Noncitizens and Citizens alike in either federal or
state court, and prosecuted there so long as the State consents to suit
or otherwise effectively waives its Sovereign Immunity.
(4) Lawsuits including federal claims against States and
commenced in state courts can be removed by States to federal
district court and thereafter can be prosecuted in federal courts by
Noncitizens and Citizens alike. And this is so even after the federal
claims have been dismissed postremoval and only state claims
remain. A State’s act of removal is one of the ways a State waives
its Sovereign Immunity.
(5) By virtue of the federal diversity jurisdiction statute, lawsuits
that include only state claims against States do not fall within the
original jurisdiction of the federal district courts, and therefore can
neither be commenced by Noncitizens or Citizens in, nor removed by
States to, federal district court.
Of course, with respect to proposition (5), the federal diversity
jurisdiction statute is subject to modification by Congress within the
limits set by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. And thus,
(6) Congress is free to amend the federal diversity jurisdiction
statute to authorize federal district courts to entertain suits involving only
state law claims and commenced by Noncitizens against States, with
the requirement that the State must consent to suit or otherwise
effectively waive its Sovereign Immunity. Congress could amend the
same statute (or the removal statute) to authorize federal district courts
to entertain diversity suits commenced by Noncitizens against States and
removed by States to federal district court. And, beyond what has
been said so far, the Eleventh Amendment has nothing more to say
about these possibilities.
16. Perhaps our guess will be comfortable, after Lapides, that Congress
will not amend the federal diversity jurisdiction statute to give the
federal district courts original jurisdiction of Noncitizens’ state lawsuits
commenced against States and expressing only nonfederal claims, with
the vagaries of State Sovereign Immunity (and its waiver) doing the
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work of what the Eleventh Amendment might have been supposed
crisply and cleanly to have been doing. But federal district court original
jurisdiction is not the only original jurisdiction within the federal judicial
power. And here is where the Lapides decision turns from risky to
explosive.
A Supreme Court that unmoors the Eleventh Amendment from its text
and says “a State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in a federal court,” one hopes, has taken full account
of itself. That is so because Article III quite clearly states: “In all
Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction.”107 And a State “free to waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity” surely must be as free to waive it in actions
commenced against the State in the United States Supreme Court as in
actions commenced against the State in the federal district courts.
Indeed, the road to the Eleventh Amendment started with Chisholm v.
Georgia, an original proceeding in the United States Supreme Court.
Speaking of Chisholm, we do well to remember that Justice Iredell’s
dissent had two main parts to it, one of which seems generally to have
been ignored in the bashing Chisholm has taken since Hans v. Louisiana.
Iredell argued that regardless of the terms of Article III of the
Constitution, State Sovereign Immunity had not been abrogated by them.
He also argued that regardless of the terms of Article III, the enablement
of those terms was up to Congress, and Congress had not enabled the
terms to abrogate State Sovereign Immunity.
I have now, I think, established the following particulars. 1st. That the
Constitution, so far as it respects the judicial authority, can only be carried into
effect by acts of the Legislature appointing Courts, and prescribing their
methods of proceeding. 2d. That Congress has provided no new law in regard
to this case, but expressly referred us to the old. 3d. That there are no
principles of the old law, to which we must have recourse, that in any manner
authorise the present suit, either by precedent or by analogy. The consequence
of which, in my opinion, clearly is, that the suit in question cannot be
maintained, nor, of course, the motion made upon it be complied with.108

Although the Supreme Court has applauded Iredell’s treatise on the
sovereignty of the States, it has jealously guarded its Article III original
jurisdiction against any notion that Congress might alter it.109 Thus,
107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
108. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
109. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 395–97 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring):
[This case raises] a grave constitutional question: namely, whether Congress
constitutionally can impose remedial limitations so jurisdictional in nature that
they effectively withdraw the original jurisdiction of this Court.
. . . In its broadest textual delegation, [Article III] authorizes Congress to
establish the “inferior Courts” and places no express limits on the
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unless saved by the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction extends to all suits between Noncitizens and States in law or
equity, whether federal question or simple diversity, subject to a
defendant State’s assertion, case by case, of Sovereign Immunity. So
says Lapides.
We may not feel too badly about the federal question lawsuits that are
filed within the High Court’s original jurisdiction, because the Court has
devised means for shuttling them off to lower federal courts.110 And
congressional power to regulate the courts so created. See U.S. Const., Art.
III, § 1, cl. 1. By contrast, that Article itself creates the Supreme Court and
textually differentiates between Congress’ relationship with the appellate and
original jurisdictions of that Court. . . . U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 . . . .
Though the original history of Art. III is sparse, what is available indicates
that these textual differences were purposeful on the Framers’ part. The
Framers obviously thought that the National Government should have a
judicial system of its own [with its own] Supreme Court. However, because
the Framers believed the state courts would be adequate for resolving most
disputes, they generally left Congress the power of determining what cases, if
any, should be channelled to the federal courts. The one textual exception to
that rule concerned the original jurisdiction, where the Framers apparently
mandated that Supreme Court review be available. “The evident purpose was
to open and keep open the highest court of the nation for the determination, in
the first instance, of suits involving a State or a diplomatic or commercial
representative of a foreign government.” Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 464
(1884). . . . [S]ee also The Federalist No. 81, pp. 507–509 (H. Lodge ed. 1888)
(A. Hamilton). Perhaps more importantly, the Framers also thought that the
original jurisdiction was a necessary substitute for the powers of war and
diplomacy that these sovereigns previously had relied upon. See Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945); United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 641 (1892). “The Supreme Court [was] given higher standing than
any known tribunal, both by the nature of its rights and the categories subject
to its jurisdiction,” A. de Toqueville, Democracy in America, p. 149 (J. Mayer
ed. 1969) (emphasis in original), precisely to keep sovereign nations and States
from using force “to rebuff the exaggerated pretensions of the Union . . . .” Id.
at 150.
Id. at 395–97; accord California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) (per curiam) (“The
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred not by the Congress but by the
Constitution itself. This jurisdiction is self-executing, and needs no legislative
implementation.”) (citations omitted); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101
n.2 (1972) (noting that Congress may provide for or deny alternate forums to the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction). See generally, James E. Pfander, Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555
(1994).
110. The Supreme Court exercises discretion over whether to hear cases that fall
within its original jurisdiction, and even over those falling within its exclusive original
jurisdiction. For examples of such discretion see United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534,
538 (1973) (per curiam); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497–99
(1971); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983); California v. Texas, 457 U.S.
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perhaps we ought not feel too badly for the diversity lawsuits we can
now expect to see filed originally in the Supreme Court—even though,
as I have shown in discussing the statutory diversity jurisdiction of the
district courts, no apparent device is available for the Court to rid itself
of this trial caseload.111
Where was Chief Justice Rehnquist when Lapides came along: he who
so carefully, in Seminole Tribe, bowed to the Eleventh Amendment’s
text and then distanced the Amendment that offered text from the
Sovereign Immunity that did the work?112 Where was Justice Kennedy,
who so painstakingly in Alden v. Maine distinguished actions initiated in
State court from actions falling within the Eleventh Amendment?113
164, 168 (1982) (per curiam); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981); Arizona
v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 796–98 (1976) (per curiam). But see Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”).
111. See Maryland, 451 U.S. at 769 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in a suit between
States brought originally in the Supreme Court):
The exercise of original jurisdiction in this case is particularly inappropriate
since the issues the plaintiff States would have us decide not only can be, but
in fact are being, litigated in other forums. Although this case would come
within our original and exclusive jurisdiction if appropriate, the question
whether it is appropriate depends in part on the availability of alternative
forums.
Id. This passage goes, not to whether the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of a
claim between States, but rather to whether the Supreme Court should exercise the
original jurisdiction it clearly has. If the Eleventh Amendment equals State Sovereign
Immunity, as Lapides seems clearly to say, then Justice Rehnquist will have ample
opportunity to craft similar dissents in auto accident cases commenced by Noncitizens
against States in the United States Supreme Court, after States waive their “Eleventh
Amendment immunity” and ask for trial by special master.
One might imagine that another “appropriate forum”—the state courts—present
themselves for these diversity claims commenced in the Supreme Court, and that the
Court can simply transfer such an action to the state court it deems appropriate. But we
must also imagine that if Congress cannot commandeer a State’s courts for the
entertainment of claims against that State, then neither can the Supreme Court. See
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 753–54 (1999):
The text of Article III, § 1, which extends federal judicial power to enumerated
classes of suits but grants Congress discretion whether to establish inferior
federal courts, does give strong support to the inference that state courts may
be opened to suits falling within the federal judicial power. The Article in no
way suggests, however, that state courts may be required to assume
jurisdiction that could not be vested in the federal courts and forms no part of
the judicial power of the United States.
....
In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution,
we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts,
an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.
112. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see
also Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Maryland v. Louisiana quoted and discussed supra
note 111.
113. We have . . . sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from suit as
“Eleventh Amendment immunity.” The phrase is convenient shorthand but
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Where was Justice Scalia, who went out of his way in College Savings
Bank to tell Justice Breyer that Hans v. Louisiana was a Sovereign
Immunity and not an Eleventh Amendment decision?114 Were these, and
perhaps other Justices as well, so interested in displaying consensus that
they compromised their earlier views? Have they changed their minds
about the distance between the Eleventh Amendment’s text and the
various Sovereign Immunity/Consent and Congressional Abrogation
doctrines they have been fighting over for the last two decades? Or were
they asleep at the switch when this easy little cert petition rolled across
their desks?
Let’s find out. How many straight diversity actions arise every year in
which a Noncitizen has claims against one of the fifty States or its
ubiquitous agencies? Maybe a thousand—vehicular accidents, tax
disputes, bond revisions, breaches of leases or contracts, runarounds at
the Office of the Secretary of State—maybe more? I am guessing that
hundreds of litigators reading this article would love to hook up with one
or two of these claimants and attempt to commence and prosecute
Noncitizen v. State before the United States Supreme Court. I suspect
that many a State would realize how much the public fisc could be
spared if, instead of litigating a Noncitizen’s claims (for which it had
already waived its sovereign immunity) from tier to tier in its own
agencies and courts, it simply started at the top by consenting to such a
Noncitizen’s suit commenced against it in the Supreme Court.
Before Lapides, the Supreme Court could join all those federal district
courts in pointing to the Eleventh Amendment’s text and then sua sponte
casting these Noncitizen-against-State lawsuits from its original jurisdiction
docket. After Lapides, the Court will have to docket the Noncitizen’s
complaint, see to service upon the State, and wait for a sign that the State
has exercised its “freedom to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity”
from suit commenced in the United States Supreme Court.
something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather,
as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations
by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their
admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except
as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
114. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 687–88 n.5 (1999).

1097

HORTON.DOC

8/22/2019 10:29 AM

My invitation here is not entirely a playful one. I think that a
contemporary Chisholm v. Georgia may provide the only sure way to
find out whether a unanimous Supreme Court in Lapides v. Board of
Regents meant what it said about the waivability of the Eleventh
Amendment’s jurisdictional barricade—a barricade that, I hope it soon
discovers, was designed as much for its own protection as for the
protection of the federalism the current Court is striving so hard to
nurture.
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